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Abstract: Although Hong Kong historically has
a  weak  trade  union  culture,  in  mid-2020
activists in the movement turned to demanding
union  representation  and  began  forming
dozens  of  small  unions  from the  ground up.
Within  a  few months  of  their  existence they
were able successfully to mount an important
strike  protesting  against  the  government’s
policy to deal with Coronavirus pandemic. But
since the passing of the National Security Law
in  July,  the  unions’  future  is  fraught  with
challenges. 
Key  words :  Hong  Kong,  trade  unions,
extradition  bill,  national  security  bill
 
For a whole year from mid-2019 to mid-2020,
the international media diligently covered the
mass demonstrations and street violence that
rocked Hong Kong. At its height, two million
out  of  Hong  Kong’s  seven  million  people
marched in protest against the extradition bill,
which  if  passed,  would  mean  that  Hong
Kongers  could  be  extradited  to  China  to  be
tried  and  imprisoned.  The  display  of  unity
among  protestors  was  unexpected,  because
only  a  few years  earlier,  the  2014 Umbrella
Movement  failed  partly  due  to  disagreement
over  tactics  among  political  activists.  Since
then,  they had fragmented into a number of
small  groups  and  political  parties  of  varied
political  persuasion,  with  a  notable  split
between a militant younger generation and a
moderate older generation of established pro-
democrats.
 
A Movement of Solidarity in Disagreement
That they could transcend their differences was
an important achievement in 2019. In the face
of a common front of antagonists ranging from
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam to the
pro-Beijing  camp  and  the  pro-establishment
elite, differences had been put aside. The pro-
democracy  movement  had  coalesced  around
three agreements. The first was expressed in
the ubiquitous slogan ‘Five Demands, Not One
Less’. It was a set of political demands broad
enough to accommodate all political leanings.
The second was a pact based on the principle of
egalitarianism,  embodied  in  the  saying
‘brothers  climbing  a  mountain,  each  trying
one’s  best’  (兄弟爬山,  各自努力),  meaning
different  protestors  could  adopt  the  strategy
they deemed best to achieve the movement’s
broad goals while not criticising or intervening
in the actions and strategies of others. We go
‘up  and  down  together’(齐上齐落)  with  no
‘splitting of the mat’! This managed to bring
together  the  two  key  blocs  of  the  protest
movement:  the ‘Valiant Braves Faction’  (勇武
派)  and  the  ‘Peaceful,  Rational,  Non-violent
Faction’ (合理非派). The former was made up
mostly  of  students  and  other  young  people,
geared up and willing to confront the police
head on. The latter was composed of those who
either would not, or could not, engage in direct
action  that  could  end  in  confrontation,  and
played supporting roles at the rear—providing
material  resources  and  organizing  and
participating  in  rallies,  joining  peaceful
activities like ‘let’s lunch together’ (和你lunch),
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raising funds, joining human chains, and taking
part in myriad other innovative actions. 
The third was an agreement there would be ‘no
big table’: i.e., no leaders sitting around a table
deciding  the  direction  of  the  movement.
Anyone could put forth proposals—any idea and
type of action—anytime and anywhere through
social media platforms. This movement was to
‘be water’—that is,  unplanned, unpredictable,
fluid,  and  spontaneous,  a  form  of  urban
guerrilla  tactics.  At  the same time,  big well-
planned rallies organized by the pro-democracy
parties  and  well-established  organizations
continued  to  be  well  attended.
 
Trade Unions in Hong Kong
When months of street actions did not extract
any concessions from the authorities,  part of
the protest movement branched off in a new
direct ion  that  was  more  formal  and
organized—the  establishment  of  as-yet-small
independent trade unions. 
I spent three weeks in Hong Kong in January
2020 conducting research on these new trade
unions.  I  carried  out  interviews  at  several
recruitment  stands  that  had  been  set  up  by
volunteers  outside  metro  stations,  at  busy
street  junctions,  and  at  hospital  entrances
during  lunch  breaks,  after  work,  and  on
weekends.  I  also  met  with  newly  elected
members of some of the new unions’ executive
(or  preparatory)  committees,  attended union-
organized labor-law training sessions, and had
meetings  with  Hong  Kong  academics  who
specialize in labor studies. I  also interviewed
staff of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade
Unions  (HKCTU),  a  pro-democracy  umbrella
union.  Since then,  back home in Australia,  I
have  kept  abreast  of  events  through  online
conversations, social media, and Hong Kong’s
mass media.
Hong  Kong  is  a  global  commercial  hub
dominated by free-market beliefs with a weak
trade  union  culture.  The  largest  union
federation  is  the  Hong  Kong  Federation  of
Trade Unions (HKFTU), with 191 affiliates and
426,000  members  as  of  2019.  It  is  well-
resourced and largely controlled by the PRC
government as a counterpart of China’s official
All-China Federation of Trade Unions—a mass
organization  subordinated  to  the  Chinese
Communist  Party  and  the  only  trade  union
legally allowed to exist in the People’s Republic
of China. Like its counterpart on the mainland,
the  HKFTU  funct ions  l ike  a  wel fare
organization, doling out money and assistance
to its pro-Beijing following. A competitive union
grouping that has a long history is the Hong
Kong  and  Kowloon  Trades  Union  Council
(HKTUC), which historically had political links
to the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan and is now
in steep decline. 
Today,  the  federation  that  is  most  active  in
organizing  workers  and  assisting  them  in
industrial  disputes and fighting for  collective
barga in ing  r ights  i s  the  Hong  Kong
Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU). It was
formed  in  1990  and  today  has  145,000
members and 93 affiliate unions. Inasmuch as it
is not directly associated with a political party,
it  is  recognized  by  the  International  Trade
Unions  Confederat ion  ( ITUC)  as  an
independent union federation. It situates itself
politically in the pro-democracy camp. The new
unions have sought help and advice from the
HKCTU,  though  its  leaders  have  resisted
playing a leadership role over them, hesitant to
be seen as intervening in a new spontaneous
trade union movement. 
 
From Loose Sand to a United Front
These new unions did not start out as products
of traditional unionizing efforts. Their birth was
conceived out of a political movement calling
for political democracy in the hope of fending
off total control by China. Initially, they did not
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propose any economic demands such as better
work  conditions,  higher  wages,  affordable
housing  or  collective  bargaining  rights.  The
earliest  volunteer  organizers  emerged  from
professions  such  as  finance,  accounting,
healthcare, social work, and education. Some of
them were  nurses,  doctors,  paramedics,  and
journalists  contributing  their  services  at  the
front  lines  of  the  street  fighting  who  had
repeatedly  seen  protesters  beaten  up  and
injured  in  police  violence,  while  they
themselves  were  sometimes  tear-gassed,
pepper-sprayed,  and  beaten  up  for  trying  to
help the injured. 
Two  motivating  forces  drove  the  initial
formation of unions. The first was a desire to
hold  a  general  strike  and  the  other  was  to
participate  in  electoral  politics.  The  call  to
launch  a  strike  came  from  the  students.
Disappointed  that  their  ‘be-water’  street
protests had extracted no concessions from the
Hong Kong government, in early August 2019
the  young  people  took  to  social  media  to
implore all  of  Hong Kong to  stage a  “Three
Strike”  (三罢),  “Three”  referred  to  workers,
students, and businesses. On August 5, the day
chosen  for  the  strike,  some  600,000  people
joined rallies held in different parts of the city.
Supporters participated in the one-day strike as
individuals, either not turning up for work or
calling in sick. At the rally venues some of them
for  the  first  time  organized  themselves  into
groups by occupation or trade.
In  September,  a  second  ‘Three  Strike’  was
called, but this time only some 40,000 people
turned  up.  Fear  of  retaliation  by  employers
deterred  many.  The  participants  grouped
themselves in ‘sectors’ (界别) because the idea
of forming new trade unions had not yet been
articulated.  There was discussion,  though,  of
creating a means to protect themselves from
managerial  harassment  and  reprisal  through
the creation of a collective support group. This
led  to  the  formation  of  a  ‘cross-sectoral
struggle preparatory committee’ (跨界别斗争预
备组) and initial talk of forming unions.
At  the  end  of  October,  after  the  suspicious
death of  a university student who had fallen
from a multi-story parking lot, angry activists
wanted to call another general strike. Posters
went  up  across  Hong  Kong,  including  a
dramatic one that read: ‘I am willing to take a
bullet for you. Are you willing to go on strike
for me?’ (see below). This third ‘Three Strike’
event eventually took place on 11 November in
many  parts  of  Hong  Kong,  and  ended  in
roadblocks and violence. 
 
‘I am willing to take a bullet for you. Are
you willing to go on strike for me?’
 
By then, a new umbrella group called the ‘Two
Million Three Strike United Front’ (两百万三罢
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联和阵线),  appeared on social  media,  posting
news about forming unions and sharing new
possible  strategies.  The group argued that  a
general strike had to be better organized at the
workplace  level.  Quickly  evolving  into  an
umbrella  organization  for  the  new  labor
movement in Hong Kong, the new group’s first
urgent task was to recruit more members. To
attract public attention, union activists set up
‘joint  union  stands’  (联合跨站),  each  hoisting
the flags of  their unions.  At a mass rally on
January 1, 2020, several dozen union flags were
raised behind a joint banner bearing the slogan
‘Trade Unions Resisting Tyranny’ (工会抗暴政).
 
The new unions with their flags forming a
united front at the mass rally of January 1
2020.
Photo credit: HKCTU, from the HKCT
statement on International Workers’ Day
2020. 
 
As most of the founding members of the new
unions  had  little  conception  of  workplace
rights,  trade  unionism  and  labor  laws,  they
invited labor lawyers and HKCTU staff to give
seminars and training sessions and began to
register  with  the  government  as  unions.
Gradually, the motivation for setting up unions
became multidimensional,  rather  than single-
mindedly  focusing  on  supporting  political
strikes.  Trade  union  leaflets  soon  included
demands  for  shorter  work  hours,  a  higher
wage, better benefits, fairer bonuses, and, not
least, collective bargaining rights. 
The second motivating force was to contribute
to electoral politics. At the end of November
2019,  the  pro-democracy  camp  unexpectedly
achieved  a  landslide  victory  in  the  District
Council  elections,  winning  a  majority  of  the
seats in 17 out of 18 of Hong Kong’s district
councils.  This  was a big morale booster  and
highlighted  the  possibility  that  the  pro-
democrats might be able to take a majority of
seats in the next two elections. The election for
Hong Kong’s  legislative  council  (LegCo)  was
scheduled for September 2020. In this election,
half of the LegCo seats were controlled by the
government,  the  other  half,  thirty-five  seats
were to be apportioned by popular vote of the
“functional  constituencies”.  The  second
election,  for  the  committee  that  selects  the
Chief Executive of Hong Kong, was expected to
be held in June 2021. 
In LegCo elections, the trade union “functional
constituency” is apportioned three of the thirty-
five  “constituency”  seats.  Each  registered
union was to be given one vote under a winner-
take-all system. This means that the larger the
number of unions the protest movement could
muster, the higher its chance of winning the
three  seats.  Before  2019,  the  pro-Beijing
HKFTU had dominated this constituency. The
pro-democracy  HKCTU,  without  resources  to
compete  in  registering  so  many  unions,  had
preferred to prioritize workplace labor rights
issues.  For  the  new  unions  and  their
supporters,  increasing  the  number  of
registered trade unions and expanding union
membership  became  an  urgent  task.
Fortunately,  the procedure to register a new
trade  union  in  Hong  Kong  is  simple.  The
minimum  requirement  is  that  seven  people
have to turn up at the Registration Bureau to
apply to register a new union by trade, sector,
or  occupation.  These initial  seven organizers
have to fill in forms stating the mission of the
new  union.  Getting  official  approval  usually
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takes about a month or two. Once approved,
the founders have to hold a general meeting to
elect  an  executive  committee  and  the  new
union is then formally registered. This ease in
registration explains the proliferation of newly
registered  pro-protest  trade  unions  in  a  few
short months. In fact, some activists started a
group called ‘7 UP’ calling on those who could
gather seven people to go to apply to set up a
un ion .  The  Hong  Kong  and  Ch inese
governments had been too confident that the
pro-Beijing camp would continue to monopolize
the registered union scene, since Hong Kong
people had never expressed much interest in
joining unions. In the new race to register trade
unions, the pro-establishment camp also tried
to create more new unions.
 
A Test of Union Solidarity with the Arrival
of COVID 19
The question of whether the new unions that
sprouted  up  during  the  protests  could
withstand political and management pressures
presented itself at the end of January 2020. The
coronavirus was spreading rapidly inside China
and quickly penetrated Hong Kong through the
many  porous  entry  points  at  Hong  Kong’s
border  with  China.  Hong  Kong  was  not
prepared to fend off the pandemic. Hospitals
were  short  of  beds,  personal  protective
equipment, and medical personnel. The newly-
formed  Health  Authority  Employees  Alliance
(HAEA),  which  had  been  actively  recruiting
new  members,  by  then  had  18,000  union
members out of the 80,000 medical and health
personnel in the city. The HAEA called on the
government to close the border with China out
of concern for the public’s and their own safety.
The demand to close the border was over a
legitimate workplace occupational  health and
safety  issue  and  had  wide  support  from the
public.
On January 31,  2020,  Carrie Lam refused to
c o n s e n t ,  a r g u i n g  t h i s  w o u l d  m e a n
discriminating against PRC citizens. The HAEA
executive  committee,  led  by  a  young  chair,
Winnie Yu (余慧明), who openly admitted that
only  half  a  year  earlier  she  had  only  cared
about  enjoying  a  good  life  and  had  no  idea
about  trade  unionism,  proposed  to  launch  a
two-stage  strike.  A  vote  was  called,  and  on
February 2 the motion was carried with 3,123
voting  yes  out  of  3,164  ballots  cast.  7,000
members, 17 percent of Hong Kong’s hospital-
related  medical  sector,  participated  in  the
strike  the  next  day.  More  than  fifty  unions
came forward to support the strike. That same
day, Carrie Lam announced all but three border
crossings  would  be  closed,  but  refused  to
budge further. 
When the first stage of the strike ended after
five days,  HAEA called for a second vote on
whether  to  continue  the  strike.  For  medical
professionals to go on strike invariably invokes
an intense moral dilemma. Having part of their
demands met,  60 percent of  the participants
voted no, and the action was called off after
that  first  success.  The  union  leaders  had
displayed an impressive ability  to organize a
mass city-wide democratic industrial action at a
critical moment on the eve of a pandemic. More
so,  it  was led by a new generation of  trade
union leaders who had to challenge an adamant
government.
After closing most of the borders, Hong Kong
was able  to  control  the  pandemic.  However,
street activities in the city continued to decline
as social  distancing rules reigned and police
suppression went unabated.  In this  relatively
quiet period, the new unions prioritized three
immediate tasks. First was to continue to set up
street  stations to  recruit  members at  risk of
being  harassed  by  the  police  and  pro-
establishment activists. Second, as suppression
at  workplaces  intensified,  activist  members
who  had  incurred  the  anger  o f  pro -
establishment  managers  and  supervisors
sought advice and help from the unions. Third,
the new unions strategized in preparation to
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contest  against  the  HKFTU  in  the  LegCo
election  that  was  scheduled  to  be  held  in
September 2020.
 
The  New  Trade  Unions  and  the  Pro-
Democracy Camp Primary Election 
Whether  the  pro-democrats  could  gain  a
reasonable  portion  of  the  70  LegCo  seats
assigned  to  the  functional  sectors  would
depend on whether the various tendencies in
the movement could coordinate so that  their
candidates  did  not  run  against  each  other
within  the  same  electoral  district,  thereby
diminishing  their  chance  of  defeating  pro-
establishment candidates.  This necessitated a
primary election from within the camp, which it
was agreed would be organized by the protest
movement.  The  various  groups  reached  an
agreement that the first five candidates in each
of the five electoral districts who received the
highest  number  of  votes  would  be  the  pro-
democrats’ candidates in the September 2020
election. Those who lost in the primary would
promise to accept defeat and withdraw their
candidacy.
The  Hong  Kong  authorities  warned  the
organizers that the primary election could be
considered  il legal,  leading  to  serious
consequences. Winnie Yu and the chairperson
of HKCTU, Carol Ng, ran as candidates from
the trade union sector in separate electorates.
The police went around the city harassing the
polling  stations.  The  organizers  ignored  the
threat and held the primary anyway on July 11
and  12  as  scheduled.  600,000  people  in
defiance of the government’s warnings chose to
line up patiently in the summer heat to cast
their votes. The result was a big win for the
young  activists  of  the  Valiant  and  Braves
Faction who garnered the highest number of
votes in the five electoral districts. This was a
significant sign of mass support not just for the
pro-democracy  camp  but  specifically  for  the
trust placed on the Valiant Faction. Winnie Yu
won by a landslide, amassing 2,165 votes out of
2,856,  against  186  votes  for  the  current
legislator  for  the  health-service  sector.  Her
courageous and well-  organized leadership in
the  February  strike  had  gained  popular
recognition. Carol Ng came in seventh in her
electoral district, reflecting a new development
in  Hong  Kong’s  pro-democracy  trade  union
movement—the  changing  of  the  guard  to  a
younger, less experienced but determined and
committed generation. The big turnout of the
primary election was a warning shot to the pro-
Beijing camp that it was likely to lose in the
September election.
Within  a  few  days  16  young  successful
candidates joined hands to form an electoral
group called the “Resistance Faction” (抗争派).
Among them was Winnie Yu. Soon after, one by
one  their  candidatures  and  four  sitting
legislators were disqualified by the government
on the grounds that they objected in principle
to the NSL. A day later tThe government even
postponed  the  September  LegCo  election  to
2021,  citing  social  distancing  problems  in  a
pandemic. The protest camp strongly suspected




In  the  late  spring  of  2020,  even  as  they
prepared  to  hold  the  primary  election,  it
became  public  knowledge  that  China  was
planning to pass a National Security Law (NSL)
to suppress opposition in Hong Kong. In June
2020,  with  the  draft  nearly  ready,  the  new
unions had to  strategize how to deal  with a
looming crackdown. Undeterred by the threat,
the unions decided to organize a general strike
on June 20 to oppose the NSL. This general
strike,  unlike  the  previous  three,  was  union-
organized. A referendum among members on
whether to go out on strike was scheduled, and
thirty  unions  agreed  to  participate  after
seeking members’ approval. The slogan to be
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used during the strike would be ‘Recover Hong
Kong;  Join  the  Union;  Union  Revolution  to
Resist Tyranny’ (光复 港, 加入工会； 工会革
命, 对抗暴政). The strike did not materialize,
however,  because only 9,000 union members
cast their votes--even though 95 percent voted
to strike.
The  NSL  was  formally  passed  by  China’s
National  People’s  Congress  on  July  1,  2020.
The  law  criminalizes  secession,  subversion,
terrorism, and collusion with foreign powers.
The  moment  the  NSL  was  passed,  the
reckoning  began  methodically.  Any  sign  of
defiance,  such  as  singing  the  Hong  Kong
protest  movement’s  anthem  or  walking  in
groups,  or  even  a  young  person  wearing  a
black  shirt  and  carrying  a  backpack  could
result  in  police  harassment  and  arbitrary
arrest. Uniformed and plainclothes police are
stationed throughout the city at street corners.
People are anxious because the law is vague
and there is no clear “red line”. Any action, or
even  thoughts,  can  be  construed  as  having
violated the offenses listed in the NSL. White
terror reigns over the city.
What  is  less  visible  is  retaliation  at  the
workplace  where  the  repercussions  have
included  blacklisting,  demotion,  penalties,
isolation or dismissal. Those who work in the
civil  service  or  government-funded  or
subsidized  sectors  are  the  most  vulnerable.
New recruits into the civil service have to take
an oath to confirm they would uphold the Basic
Law  and  swear  loyalty  to  the  Hong  Kong
government. Those who refused to sign would
not be employed and could even be construed
as subversive. Public servants who are already
employed have to pledge loyalty.
The other most targeted sector is  education.
High  school  students’  active  and  innovative
participation  in  the  protest  movement
surprised and disturbed the Chinese and Hong
Kong  governments.  About  3,000  of  the  over
10,000  people  arrested  since  mid-2019  are
secondary  and  university  students.  The
Secretary of the Security Bureau of the Hong
Kong  government  announced,  “the  foremost
target is the education sector. The main task is
to cleanse it of ‘bad apples’ to save the students
from being poisoned” He was confident  that
this could be achieved in one or two years. No
time has been lost in ordering schools to forbid
students  from joining protest  groups.  Urgent
measures  have  been rolled  out  to  prevent  a
generation  of  primary  school  students  from
identifying  with  the  rebellious  older  cohorts.
Textbooks, particularly those used for courses
in  social  science  and  humanities,  are
scrutinised, changed and revised. Teachers and
staff have to acknowledge loyalty to China and
the Hong Kong government. Above all, parents
and  students  are  encouraged  to  report  on
teachers  who  are  deemed  to  have  deviated
from the official line. Up till August 2020 there
were  247  complaints  against  teachers.  Two
primary  school  teachers  quickly  lost  their
teaching  licences  for  introducing  ideas  of
democracy and making “factual errors” about
Chinese history. Both the new and established
education  trade  unions  criticised  the
government for political censorship but to no
avail.
Controls were exerted to curtail freedom of the
press.  The  owner  of  Apple  Daily,  the  most
popular  pro-democracy  Chinese-language
newspaper,  was  arrested  and  charged  in
September. A new policy gives police the power
to decide whether a journalist is eligible for a
press  pass.  This  means  a  large  number  of
journalists working for electronic newspapers,
student  journalists,  and  freelance  journalists
are  not  recognized  as  journalists,  depriving
them of legal protection while covering news.
They can be beaten up, arrested and charged
as  if  they  are  protesters.  To  the  police,
journalists  are  considered  enemies  because
they had reported about police violence on the
front  lines.  Various  media-related institutions
stepped forth to protest and demanded the new
policy  should  be  repealed.  At  the  time  of
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writing it is unclear how this will be resolved.
In the medical and health sector the Hospital
Authority sent out letters in October to those
who were absent on the days of the strike in
February  demanding  they  explain  their
absence.  Winnie  Yu  hurriedly  advised  her
members not to sign until the union has sought
legal advice. Meanwhile the union organized a
petition signed by 5000 members arguing that
the healthcare strike was legal and demanding
that  the  bureau  meet  with  the  union.  The
petition was presented in person to the bureau
chief  to  underscore  the  legitimacy  of  their
industrial action.
My communications with sources in Hong Kong
and my reading of the protest movement’s on-
line media reveal that in these and other job
sectors,  a  fair  number  of  union  members--
scared,  feeling isolated,  unclear  as  to  where
the red-line is,  not knowing how to act  in a
tightening  workplace  culture,  and  forced  to
show loyalty  to  the Hong Kong and Chinese
governments against their own conscience—are
seeking advice from the unions. 
For the time being the pro-establishment ruling
elite  is  busy rolling out  suppressive counter-
measures  against  the  pro-democracy
movement’s ‘revolution of our times!’ (时代 革
命),  which  Beijing  condemns  as  a  ‘color
revolution.’  The prognosis  for  the  new trade
unions  is  not  bright.  Deregistering  or
suppressing  the  pro-democracy  trade  unions
has  not  yet  begun.  Their  voices  through
institutional  channels  have  already  been
muffled,  though.  In  November,  through
manipulation  of  the  election  for  the  Labour
Consultative  Committee,  all  five  committee
sea t s  a re  now  monopo l i zed  by  pro -
establishment unions. The “Two Million Three
Strike United Front” continues to provide an
on-line  platform  to  hold  the  movement
together. It is clear that some of the new union
members  are  demoral ized.  Some  are
determined to push on. What is to be done? For
the time being, it is generally agreed that the
pro-democracy  camp  should  lie  low  and  re-
emerge when a chance presents itself. 
This is a revised and expanded version of an
article published in the Vol 5, Issue 2 February
2020 edition of Made in China under the title
“From  Unorganised  Street  Protests  to
Organising Unions: The Birth of a New Trade
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